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Abstract
Background: Exploration of the cognitive systems underlying human friendship will be advanced by identifying the evolved
functions these systems perform. Here we propose that human friendship is caused, in part, by cognitive mechanisms
designed to assemble support groups for potential conflicts. We use game theory to identify computations about friends
that can increase performance in multi-agent conflicts. This analysis suggests that people would benefit from: 1) ranking
friends, 2) hiding friend-ranking, and 3) ranking friends according to their own position in partners’ rankings. These possible
tactics motivate the hypotheses that people possess egocentric and allocentric representations of the social world, that
people are motivated to conceal this information, and that egocentric friend-ranking is determined by allocentric
representations of partners’ friend-rankings (more than others’ traits).
Methodology/Principal Findings: We report results from three studies that confirm predictions derived from the alliance
hypothesis. Our main empirical finding, replicated in three studies, was that people’s rankings of their ten closest friends
were predicted by their own perceived rank among their partners’ other friends. This relationship remained strong after
controlling for a variety of factors such as perceived similarity, familiarity, and benefits.
Conclusions/Significance: Our results suggest that the alliance hypothesis merits further attention as a candidate
explanation for human friendship.
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Introduction
Although friendship is a core element of human social life, its
evolved functions remain poorly understood [1]. Human friend-
ship often occurs among individuals who are neither relatives nor
mates, ruling out key explanations for cooperation such as kin
selection. Nonetheless, similar relationships have been observed in
non-human species, and understanding of these long-term, dyadic,
non-kin, non-sexual relationships has progressed apace. Hyenas
use partners to gain access to carcasses [2], male dolphins employ
partners to attain females for mating [3], juvenile rooks use
partners to get food [4], and numerous primate species groom
partners to garner agonistic support [5]. From a functional
perspective, to the extent that an organism is designed to influence
other individuals, these individuals can be understood as devices in
the organism’s ‘‘extended phenotype’’ [6]. What are the evolved
functions of human friends?
Traditional evolutionary approaches explain human friendship
by applying the theory of reciprocal altruism [7]. On this view,
friends function as exchange partners, from whom gains in trade
can be profitably extracted, provided that cheaters can be avoided.
However, a wealth of empirical evidence from social psychology is
inconsistent with the exchange theory. Contradicting a key
prediction of reciprocity theories, people do not carefully monitor
benefits given and received in close relationships [1,8–12]. Also,
people seem to help friends even when they are unlikely to be
capable of repayment [12]. This suggests that friendship involves
more than exchange.
Friendship might be illuminated by considering other cognitive
systems, in addition to exchange mechanisms, that humans use to
manage the complex social world [13,14]. Specifically, we
consider this hypothesis: Friendship is generated, in part, by
cognitive systems that function to assemble a support group for
potential conflicts. This ‘‘alliance hypothesis’’ proposes that
human friendship is less like trade and more like alliance politics.
Human conflicts are usually decided by the number of supporters
mobilized on each side (rather than strength or agility). This is true
for a wide range of disputes, from family debates over weekend
plans [15] to homicidal attacks [16]. Therefore, individuals can
increase their power by creating and maintaining a network of
allies, well in advance, before the onset of an argument or quarrel.
Here we develop and test predictions derived from the alliance
hypothesis. One central prediction is that alliance-building
mechanisms should evaluate partners’ loyalties to their other
friends, using this information to rank friends according to how
they rank the self. Our main empirical finding, replicated in three
studies, was that people’s rankings of their ten closest friends were
predicted by their own perceived rank among their partners’ other
friends. This relationship remained strong after controlling for a
variety of factors such as perceived similarity, familiarity, and
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plays a crucial role in friendship and that the alliance hypothesis
merits further attention.
The Puzzle of Communal Relationships Among Nonkin
Clark and Mills [9] distinguished between exchange relation-
ships, in which individuals give benefits and expect repayment,
and communal relationships, in which individuals give benefits
according to the recipient’s needs, without expecting a specific
response. They found that people seeking an exchange relation-
ship preferred partners who returned favors, whereas people
seeking a communal relationship showed greater liking for
partners who did not give benefits in return. In a subsequent
experiment [8], pairs of participants (strangers or friends)
completed a joint task for a reward which could be divided
equally or according to their respective contributions. Pairs of
strangers typically tracked individual contributions by using
different color pens, while friends generally chose not to monitor
inputs. A similar experiment showed that strangers frequently
monitored a light that indicated their partner’s contributions
whereas friends did so much less often [17].
Similarly, Fiske’s [10] relational models theory asserted that
exchange and communal relationships are fundamentally distinct,
comprising two of the four basic psychological models used to
manage human social life. Fiske claimed that communal sharing
relationships are based on a ‘‘principle of equivalence’’ that
facilitates sharing and ‘‘makes it impossible to make graduated
differentiations among people’’ (p. 716). The exchange/communal
distinction is supported by a diverse array of evidence, including
ethnographic fieldwork [18] and a series of experiments showing
that relationship type explains how people categorize [19], recall
[20], substitute [21], and misidentify [22,23] individuals with
whom they have relationships. Fiske’s theory has also been useful
for understanding taboo thinking [11] and indirect speech [24].
Taken together, the empirical evidence shows that close
relationships are conceptualized and structured in a way that
fundamentally differs from exchange relationships. How, then, did
the cognitive systems underlying communal relationships evolve?
Researchers in this area typically appeal to some form of kin
selection, such as the evolution of parental care mechanisms
[10,25]. Kin selection might explain communal relationships
among relatives, but what explains communal relationships among
nonkin? It is sometimes assumed that friendships are caused by
mistakes in systems designed for kin altruism. However, as Silk [1]
has pointed out, this idea is implausible, as it implies that humans
are less flexible and discriminating in relationships than nonhu-
man primates. Another idea is that people form committed
friendships to buffer against potential crises such as illness or
injury; in this model, people commit to a friend to solicit the
friend’s commitment because faking commitment is difficult [12].
In sum, friendship remains puzzling. What evolved functions
are performed by the cognitive systems underlying communal
friendships?
Alliance Mechanics
The alliance hypothesis is derived from ideas developed in game
theory [26] and international relations [27]. Just as aerodynamic
theory can describe a gradient of functionality for flight
mechanisms, game theory can describe a gradient of functionality
for strategic decision-making, thereby allowing performance-
enhancing cognitive mechanisms to be identified.
Alliance formation fundamentally differs from reciprocal
exchange in important respects. Whereas exchange can be
modeled with two-player games (like the Prisoner’s Dilemma),
alliances are defined in games with three or more players [26, see
pp. 220–237]. The simplest alliance problem is a zero-sum three-
player game like the Simple Majority Game [26] in which three
players each choose one of the other players. If two players choose
each other, they form an alliance and get K each, while the
excluded player gets -1; if no two players choose each other, all
players get 0. Beyond this simplest case, more complex alliance
problems can be described by adding asymmetric alliance
strengths, within-alliance bargaining, nonzero-sum payoffs, more
players, more strategies, uncertainty, and so on [26].
The Simple Majority Game shows that alliance formation, even
in the simplest case, is qualitatively different from two-player
exchange because in alliance formation, benefiting one player requires
harming another [26]. George Liska, in his landmark treatise on
alliances, wrote that ‘‘alliances are against, and only derivatively
for, someone or something’’ [28, p. 12]. In these situations,
exchange strategies like tit-for-tat [29] are unworkable: When
there is a dispute between two of an individuals’ cooperative
partners (both with high probabilities of repetition and histories of
cooperation), choosing sides makes it impossible to match
cooperation with cooperation for both partners.
We are not suggesting, of course, that in all multi-player
conflicts, individuals must necessarily choose sides, i.e., form
alliances. People apply a wide breadth of tactics to manage others’
conflicts such as mediation, arbitration, and suppression [30]. We
simply point out that when disputants are unable to reconcile their
interests, then third parties face the unique and difficult problem of
deciding to help/harm one side or the other.
In short, the core problem in alliance decisions is choosing sides.
There is no consensus on the correct normative model for these
choices. However, we highlight two decision procedures drawn
from the international relations literature [27].
One decision procedure is bandwagoning [27]. Individuals can side
with the disputant that seems most likely to win the argument or
quarrel. This method helps individuals avoid ending up on the
losing side of a fight–a potentially costly outcome. Any initial
advantage by one disputant is magnified when third parties engage
in bandwagoning. Individuals with more supporters are more likely
to win, and they get more supporters as a result, setting in motion a
self-reinforcing process in which the powerful get more powerful.
Alternatively, individuals can side with the disputant who would
be most likely to side with them in potential future conflicts. By
protecting their own supporters, individuals can increase their
future power to prevail in conflicts. This decision procedure
creates feedback loops of affinity among allies. When an individual
shows allegiance to their partner, they become more valuable to
that partner, who in turn increases allegiance to the individual,
and so on. The escalating affinity between Britain and France in
the decade leading into the First World War provides an
illustrative example [31]. This feedback dynamic can be described
as an ‘‘integrative spiral’’ [31] or as alliance-building (the reverse
occurs among adversaries). The result is that an individual can
come to deeply value a partner precisely because they are allies,
independent of the partner’s desirable or undesirable traits.
Bandwagoning and alliance-building are opposing forces that
can result in a wide range of group coalition structures depending
on their relative strengths [32]. Bandwagoning pushes group
structure toward a linear dominance hierarchy with one extremely
powerful individual who leverages unanimous group support.
Alliance-building pulls group structure toward pairs who loyally
defend each other. A variety of intermediate alliance structures
exist between these extremes.
Finally, the tactics described above imply that alliance
information is very sensitive. Third parties might take one side
Alliance Hypothesis
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allegiances. Thus individuals should display, conceal, or distort
information about their alliances as required. As Snyder [31] has
shown, one important case is a ‘‘straddle strategy’’ in which
individuals conceal their allegiances. Low-valued partners might
not shift loyalties if they don’t know their low value; high-valued
partners might be less emboldened to provoke a fight if alliance
support is uncertain.
Do Friends Function as Allies?
Alliances and exchange pose different adaptive problems which
require different information-processing solutions. Researchers
have identified a number of computations that support successful
exchange [7,29], including individual recognition, memory of
transaction histories, and the ability to detect and discriminate
against non-reciprocators. What cognitive mechanisms might help
individuals navigate the world of alliances?
Multi-player conflicts are complex and require sophisticated
computations. To accomplish bandwagoning, individuals must
estimate the relative power of any two disputants, which might
depend on many factors including their respective alliances. For
example, hyenas maintain representations of all group members’
statuses, and they use status information to choose sides in
conflicts, always siding with the higher status fighter [33].
Siding with one’s more reliable allies is even more cognitively
demanding. Individuals need an egocentric representation of other
group members indicating which side to take for any given
conflict. The simplest specification of this type would be a
transitive ranking of other group members. To protect their more
reliable allies, individuals should rank partners according to how
their partners rank them, preferring partners who rank them
higher. To accomplish this, individuals need representations of
other group members’ loyalties to the other group members. That
is, they must represent the world of alliances as it is seen by
everyone else. Borrowing terminology from the spatial cognition
literature [34], individuals need to maintain allocentric representa-
tions of the social world.
Thus, the adaptive problems posed by alliance and exchange
differ in their computational descriptions. These candidate
functions therefore make different predictions about the cognitive
processes underlying friendship. Most basically, each type of
system should seek different information. Exchange mechanisms
should focus on one’s own transaction histories and expectations
about future interactions; bandwagoning mechanisms should
assess others’ power and parse status hierarchies; and alliance-
building mechanisms should evaluate others’ relative loyalties to
other group members. By examining the mental processes
underlying friendship, it might be possible to distinguish the
functions these systems perform.
The Present Studies
An obvious first step toward understanding friend cognition is to
examine the direct product of these computational systems:
Participants’ current representations of their closest friends and
their properties. For example, if participants report preferences for
friends whom they perceive to give fewer benefits, be less powerful,
or value others more than them, then the respective hypothesis is
contradicted.
We testedwhether people readily rank their close friends in a way
that is meaningful to them. Alliance-building requires an egocentric
friend-ranking. In contrast, Fiske [10] claimed that communal
relationships observe a ‘‘principle of equivalence,’’ meaning that
close friends should be undifferentiated and any ranking should be
meaningless. Anecdotally, people frequently assert that they value
all friends equally. However, this phenomenon might be a tactic for
hiding friends’ ranks (see above regarding the ‘‘straddle strategy’’).
To investigate this, we looked at whether people are motivated to
conceal their friend-ranking in public.
Finally, and most centrally, we examined individuals’ perceptions
of their friends’ properties to see which properties predict higher
friend rank. We selected properties that fit with candidate
explanations for friendship, including alliance-building and band-
wagoning, as well as theories surrounding exchange [7,35–37],
familiarity [38], proximity [39], and similarity [40]. These theories
imply different hypotheses about which variables will be the
strongest predictors of friend rank. For example, exchange theories
predict that received benefits should dominate, whereas familiarity
predicts that frequency of contact should be most important.
Methods
Ethics Statement
Participants received a consent form which they were required
to read. Written consent was not required because the data were
analyzed anonymously. The consent form, consent procedure, and
all study procedures were approved by the University of
Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board.
Study 1
Design. To examine friend-ranking, we used a point
allocation task. Constant-sum allocation tasks have been used in
marketing research to examine consumer preferences [41]. If
ranking friends is not meaningful to participants (because friends
are undifferentiated and valued equally), then point allocations
should be uniformly distributed across friend-ranks. However, if
people readily rank friends, then point allocations should be
skewed, with high-ranking partners attracting a greater proportion
of limited friendship points.
We examined whether people hide their rankings with a within-
subject public manipulation. Participants repeated the allocation
task while imagining that their friends would know their decisions.
If participants conceal ranking, disparity in point allocations
should shrink in public, with high-ranking friends receiving fewer
points and low-ranking friends receiving more points, relative to
the private condition.
Finally, the main task of this study was designed to investigate
predictors of friend-rank. We used a repeated measures design in
which we measured participants’ friendship attributes for ten
friends. Central to the alliance hypothesis, one of these attributes
was the participant’s own perceived rank among each partner’s
other friends. To look at exchange, we asked participants to rate
the amount of material and social benefits that they receive as a
result of the friendship. To the extent that friends function as trade
partners, the volume of incoming benefits should influence
closeness. Participants also rated similarity, secret sharing, several
traits (caring, intelligence, attractiveness, and popularity), and they
indicated duration, frequency of contact, sex, and age.
Participants, Materials, and Procedure. We recruited 54
participants (26 females, 28 males; ages 18–22 years, M=18.94;
SD=1.12) to answer questions about ten of their friendships,
providing information about 540 friendships. Participants were
undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania. After giving
informed consent, participants completed a friendship questionnaire
at the Penn Laboratory for Experimental Evolutionary Psychology.
The questionnaire is included as Supporting Information S1. The
questionnaire consisted of the following items.
Friend-ranking task. Participants listed the initials of their
10 best friends in rank order from best friend to tenth best friend.
Alliance Hypothesis
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sexual partners.
Friendship point allocation task. Participants divided a
limited budget of 100 points among their ten best friends in
proportion to the participant’s relative closeness with each friend.
This task was completed in two within-subject conditions: a private
condition and a public condition; in the latter, participants were
instructed to imagine that their friends would know their allocation
decisions. The instructions of the public task inherently draw
attention to the private-public distinction, but this is not true of the
private task. Hence, we administered the private condition before
the public condition, without counterbalancing, to minimize any
effects of knowing the manipulation on the private allocations.
Whereas the nature of the public task creates the possibility of
experimenter demand, we think it is unlikely that participants
could infer our specific hypothesis (points distributed more equally)
unless they shared the friendship intuitions here under study.
Nonetheless, we examined order effects with a counterbalanced
design in Study 3 (see below).
Friendship properties measures. Participants answered
items about the properties of each friend or friendship. Central to
our hypotheses, they reported their perceived rank in each
partner’s friend-ranking. Also, using a seven-point scale (1=low
and 7=high), participants reported received benefits, similarity,
and secret sharing. To examine friends’ traits, participants used
the same scale to rate each friend’s caring, intelligence,
attractiveness, and popularity. Finally, participants reported each
friend’s age and sex, friendship duration (years), and frequency of
contact (per week).
Participants completed the items in this order: ranking task, the
private allocation task, the properties measures, and then the
public allocation task. Upon completion of the questionnaire,
participants were debriefed and dismissed. The procedure lasted
25 minutes.
Data Analysis. We used ordinal logistic regression to
examine predictors of friend-rank among our measures of
friendship properties. Logistic regression fits a linear model to
the logit (log odds) of a discrete dependent variable; the coefficient
b is in terms of the log odds, and therefore, exp(b) gives the change
in odds per unit change in the associated predictor. When the
dependent variable has more than two categories, and the
categories possess a natural order, ordinal logistic regression is
appropriate. In this case, exp(b) describes the change in the
generalized odds of being in a higher category in the ordinal scale.
We used standardized values to compare coefficients across
variables, so coefficients indicate the change in the odds for an
increase of one standard deviation for a given independent
variable. For example, b=1.68 for perceived rank in Study 1 (see
below) indicates that for each unit (SD) increase in perceived rank,
friends have exp(1.68)=5.37 times greater odds of being ranked a
better friend. Finally, because the data are repeated measures
(participants’ responses for each of ten friends) and the present
research focuses on individual level effects, we included subject as
a random effect in the model.
Study 2
Important changes occur in individuals’ friendships during the
transition from high school to college [42]. Thus, college
undergraduates might differ from the broader population in their
friendship patterns. Study 2 replicated Study 1 with participants
recruited from Center City Philadelphia.
Participants, Materials, and Procedure. In Center City
Philadelphia, 49 participants (22 females, 27 males) were paid $5 to
complete friendship questionnaires. In the park at Rittenhouse
Square, we approached individuals who were not engaged in social
interaction. Participants answered questions about ten of their
friendships, providing information about 490 friendships. The
participants ranged in age from 18 to 65 years, M=31.76,
SD=13.33. We used the same materials and procedure as in Study 1.
Study 3
Study 3 replicated the previous studies in a larger web-based
sample.
Participants, Materials, and Procedure. We recruited
182 (120 females, 62 males) participants to answer questions
about ten of their friendships, providing information about 1,820
friendships. Participants volunteered to participate in an online
study for which they received a small payment. Participants
ranged in age from 18 to 70, M=31.00, SD=10.69. The materials
and procedure were the same as in Study 1 except that the
questions were converted to html format.
Results
Study 1
Point Allocations in Private and Public. Point allocations
dropped off steeply as a function of rank, with best friend
attracting nearly a quarter of the total points (Figure 1). A chi-
square goodness-of-fit test showed that the aggregate point
allocations differed significantly from a uniform distribution, x
2
(9, N=5,400)=1,735.21, p,.001. Looking at just the top two
friends, points allocated to the best friend differed from points
allocated to the 2
nd best friend, x
2 (1, N=2,121)=56.04, p,.001.
Figure 1. Mean (SD) point allocations by friend-rank. The null
hypothesis that people do not rank their closest friends predicts a flat
line at 10 points.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005802.g001
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(Figure 2). As hypothesized, high-ranking friends received fewer
points in public, while low-ranking friends received more points.
Looking at the individual level, we computed for each participant
the average (absolute) allocation difference across the 45 pairings
among their ten closest friends. That is, for each participant’s set of
10 allocation amounts, y, we computed the mean difference (MD),
given by:
MD~
Xn
i~1
Xn
j~1 yi{yj
       
.
nn {1 ðÞ
The MD, a common measure of statistical dispersion, was used
to measure non-equivalence in friendship point allocations. Mean
(SD) values for this metric were 6.8 (2.6) points in private and 5.3
(3.2) points in public. Looking within-subject, dispersion in public
was less than, equal to, and greater than the private condition for
61%, 24%, and 14% of participants, respectively. Because the data
violated normality, we conducted a Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
finding that participants’ allocations exhibited less dispersion in
public than in private, Z=4.41, p,.001, one-tailed.
Friendship Properties and Friend-Rank. Table 1 reports
descriptive statistics for the friendship properties measures. We
analyzed the relationships between these properties and friend-
rank. For ease of interpretation, we transformed friend-rank and
perceived rank by multiplying by -1 so that high-ranking
individuals, such as friend number 1, are denoted by
numerically greater values than low-ranking individuals, such as
friend number 10. In a preliminary analysis, we computed simple
correlations for each participant between rank and friend
properties (treating rank as continuous). Table 2 reports the
mean (SD) for participants’ correlations between friend rank and
each friendship property. The largest correlations were with
perceived rank, secrets, similarity, and benefits.
Because friend-rank is an ordinal variable, we constructed an
ordinal logistic model of friend-rank (Table 3). The ordinal logistic
regression allowed us to look at each predictor controlling for all
other factors. The variables friend-rank, perceived rank, and age
difference were multiplied by -1 for ease of comparison with the
other variables. Predictors were first assessed for collinearity by
examining intercorrelations; correlations were relatively small with
the highest absolute value at r=.48. Because we were interested in
individual level effects, we entered subject in the model as a
random effect. The model overall was statistically significant,
Figure 2. The change in aggregate point allocations caused by
the public manipulation. Bar values represent the public minus
private difference divided by private points to give the percent change.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005802.g002
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Friendship Properties.
Variable Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
M SD M SD M SD Range
a
Perceived rank 5.17 3.58 5.28 3.68 6.73 5.52 1–40
Benefits 3.74 1.78 4.31 1.89 3.52 1.90 1–7
Similarity 4.34 1.52 4.43 1.62 4.05 1.71 1–7
Frequency (per week) 6.84 8.67 4.71 7.41 4.58 6.39 0–35
Duration (yrs) 5.17 4.04 9.69 10.21 8.93 8.04 0–65
Secrets 4.27 1.82 4.80 1.86 4.05 2.07 1–7
Caring 5.22 1.35 5.34 1.59 5.15 1.62 1–7
Popularity 5.11 1.35 5.49 1.50 4.79 1.67 1–7
Intelligence 5.49 1.25 5.66 1.30 5.22 1.49 1–7
Attractiveness 4.85 1.39 5.32 1.38 4.68 1.56 1–7
Same-sex
b .78 .41 .69 .46 .74 .44 0–1
Age difference (yrs) 0.46 1.23 3.69 6.54 4.19 5.89 0–47
Note. Mean and standard deviation for properties of participants’ friendships.
aThe range across all three studies.
bSame-sex=1, opposite-sex=0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005802.t001
Table 2. Correlations with Friend-Rank.
Variable Study 1
a Study 2
b Study 3
c
MS D MS D MS D
Perceived rank .71 .25 .50 .38 .68 .34
Benefits .45 .35 .45 .37 .45 .42
Similarity .55 .32 .39 .37 .53 .37
Frequency (per week) .16 .48 .24 .41 .40 .40
Duration (yrs) .25 .41 .22 .34 .29 .44
Secrets .60 .33 .40 .42 .64 .34
Caring .30 .39 .25 .36 .33 .36
Popularity .16 .34 .18 .35 .11 .42
Intelligence .13 .37 .16 .31 .23 .35
Attractiveness .03 .37 .13 .34 .15 .37
Note. Mean (SD) values across participants for correlations between each
variable and friend-rank. Friend-rank and perceived rank variables were
transformed by multiplying by -1.
aStudy 1 means are significantly different (Bonferroni corrected) from zero
except frequency, intelligence, and attractiveness.
bStudy 2 means are significant except attractiveness.
cAll Study 3 means are significant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005802.t002
Alliance Hypothesis
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2(66)=544.58, p,.001. Looking at the coefficients, the strongest
significant predictors (in order of magnitude) were perceived rank,
popularity, benefits, similarity, secrets, same-sex, attractiveness,
and intelligence. The non-significant factors were frequency,
duration, caring, and age difference.
Study 2
Point Allocations in Private and Public. Mean (SD) point
allocations are shown in Figure 1. A chi-square goodness-of-fit test
showed that the aggregate point allocations differed significantly
from a uniform distribution, x
2(9, N=4,900)=1,159.03, p,.001.
Looking at just the top two friends, points allocated to the best
friend differed from points allocated to 2
nd best friend, x
2 (1,
N=1,772)=56.35, p,.001.
Point allocations differed in the public condition relative to the
private condition (Figure 2). To examine changes at the individual
level, we compared the mean difference (MD) of participants’
allocation values in private and public conditions. Mean (SD)
values for this measure were 6.4 (2.0) points in private and 5.5 (3.4)
points in public. In the public condition, dispersion was less than,
equal to, and greater than the private condition for 39%, 43%,
and 18% of participants, respectively. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test
showed that participants’ allocations exhibited less dispersion in
public than in private, Z=2.24, p=.02, one-tailed.
Friendship Properties and Friend-Rank. Table 1 reports
descriptive statistics for the friendship properties measures.
Compared with the Penn students in Study 1, participants
reported longer friendship durations (M=9.69 versus 5.17 years)
and greater absolute age differences (M=3.69 versus 0.46). Table 2
reports the mean (SD) for participants’ correlations between friend
rank and each friendship property. The largest correlations were
with perceived rank, benefits, secrets, and similarity.
We conducted an ordinal logistic regression to examine
predictors of friend-rank (Table 3). As in Study 1, friend-rank,
perceived rank, and absolute age difference were transformed by
multiplying by -1. Predictors were assessed for collinearity by
examining intercorrelations, which were relatively small with the
highest absolute value at r=.46. Because we were interested in
individual level effects, we entered subject in the model as a
random effect. The model overall was statistically significant,
x
2(61)=244.11, p,.001. Looking at the coefficients, the strongest
significant predictors (in order of magnitude) were perceived rank,
benefits, similarity, secrets, and same-sex. The non-significant
factors were frequency, duration, caring, popularity, intelligence,
attractiveness, and age difference.
Study 3
Point Allocations in Private and Public. Figure 1 shows
the mean (SD) point allocations across partners with each friend-
rank. A chi-square goodness-of-fit test showed that the aggregate
point allocations differed significantly from a uniform distribution,
x
2 (9, N=18,200)=8,426.58, p,.001. Looking at just the top two
friends, points allocated to the best friend differed from points
allocated to 2
nd best friend, x
2 (1, N=8,009)=415.00, p,.001.
Point allocations differed in the public condition, relative to the
private condition (Figure 2). To examine changes at the individual
level, we compared the mean difference (MD) of participants’
allocation values in private and public conditions. Mean (SD)
values for this measure were 7.86 (3.30) points in private and 6.67
(3.93) points in public. In the public condition, dispersion was less
than, equal to, and greater than the private condition for 40%,
51%, and 10% of participants, respectively. A Wilcoxon signed-
rank test showed that participants’ allocations exhibited less
dispersion in public than in private, Z=6.00, p,.001, one-tailed.
In this and previous studies, participants completed the private
allocation before the public allocation. To check for order effects,
we ran an additional web-based sample of participants (n=101;
61% female; age: M=30.13, SD=10.75) in the opposite order
with the public allocation occurring before the private allocation.
The mean (SD) values for the dispersion measure were 8.94 (4.09)
points in private and 7.76 (3.80) points in public. In the public
condition, dispersion was less than, equal to, and greater than the
private condition for 46%, 41%, and 14% of participants,
respectively. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that partici-
Table 3. Ordinal Logistic Model of Friend-Rank
Variable Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
b
a SE Wald x
2 b
a SE Wald x
2 b
a SE Wald x
2
Perceived rank 1.68 0.14 156.95*** 0.77 0.11 49.25*** 1.21 0.08 238.83***
Benefits 0.55 0.11 22.41*** 0.60 0.13 24.27*** 0.48 0.06 56.30***
Similarity 0.49 0.12 17.19*** 0.41 0.11 14.93*** 0.70 0.06 128.52***
Frequency 20.17 0.09 1.33 0.22 0.07 3.29 0.44 0.10 20.09***
Duration 0.16 0.12 2.15 0.20 0.10 2.97 0.21 0.06 13.08***
Secrets 0.55 0.13 17.06*** 0.33 0.11 8.60** 0.77 0.07 128.13***
Caring 0.05 0.11 0.31 20.02 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.06 2.34
Popularity 0.58 0.11 27.92*** 0.12 0.11 1.43 0.09 0.06 3.05
Intelligence 0.21 0.10 4.51* 0.10 0.10 0.91 20.02 0.06 0.09
Attractiveness 20.25 0.10 5.58* 0.06 0.11 0.27 0.05 0.06 0.86
Same-sex 0.29 0.05 9.39** 0.21 0.05 5.70* 0.03 0.02 1.88
Age difference 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.27 0.05 24.06***
Note. Effect tests for ordinal logistic model of friend-rank. Friend-rank and perceived rank variables were transformed by multiplying by 21.
aStandardized logistic regression coefficient. The exponential of b is the change in the odds of being ranked a better friend for each unit (SD) increase in the associated
predictor.
*p,.05. **p,.01. ***p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005802.t003
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private, Z=4.70, p,.001, one-tailed.
Friendship Properties and Friend-Rank. Table 1 reports
descriptivestatisticsforthefriendshippropertiesmeasures.Friendship
durations (M=8.93) and absolute age differences (M=4.19) were
greater than for Study 1 and comparable to Study 2. Table 2 reports
the mean (SD) for participants’ correlations between friend rank and
each friendship property. The largest correlations were with
perceived rank, secrets, benefits, and similarity.
We conducted an ordinal logistic regression to examine
predictors of friend-rank (Table 3). As in Study 1, friend-rank,
perceived rank, and absolute age difference were transformed by
multiplying by -1. Predictors were assessed for collinearity by
examining intercorrelations, which were relatively small with the
highest absolute value at r=.53. Because we were interested in
individual level effects, we entered subject in the model as a
random effect. The model overall was statistically significant,
x
2(194)=1,613.35, p,.001. Looking at the coefficients, the
strongest significant predictors (in order of magnitude) were
perceived rank, secrets, similarity, benefits, frequency, duration,
and age difference. The non-significant factors were same-sex,
caring, popularity, intelligence, and attractiveness.
Discussion
People differentiated among their friends when allocating a
limited budget of friendship points. In contrast to the idea that
friends are equivalent and undifferentiated [10], people seemed to
readily rank their friends. In fact, the greatest disparities were
observed among individuals’ closest friends (see Figure 1). This
finding is consistent with an alliance-building model as well as
theories surrounding exchange, similarity, and familiarity. Further,
the effect of the modest manipulation–simply imagining that
allocations would be known–suggests that people try to hide
differences between friends. Perhaps the ‘‘principle of equiva-
lence’’ observed for communal relationships reflects similar
attempts to conceal sensitive alliance information.
Our main findings surrounded the predictors of participants’
friend rankings. Consistent with exchange and similarity theories,
we found significant effects for benefits and similarity in all three
studies. Additionally, we found a striking effect for the key alliance
variable: Individuals’ own perceived rank was the strongest
predictor of friend-rank. Perceived rank remained a powerful
predictor after controlling for a range of variables from current
theories of friendship. Friends’ traits (e.g., intelligence, caring), and
features identified in the friendship literature as important
(similarity, benefits, frequency of contact, etc., [43]), were
relatively weak predictors by comparison.
This finding is consistent with game theoretic analyses showing
that individuals’ traits have little influence over which alliances are
formed [26,31]. When individuals value each other precisely
because their partner values them (versus the partner’s traits), a
self-reinforcing process of alliance-building is set in motion. Snyder
[31] referred to this alliance dynamic as an ‘‘integrative spiral’’
and the effect can also be understood as a special case of the
general idea proposed by Tooby and Cosmides [12] that
friendship is the product of a self-reinforcing process.
Previous studies similarly found that friend liking was correlated
with how much friends like oneself more than other friends
[44,45]. This pattern was interpreted as the result of preferences
for absolute metrics such as received benefits, frequency of contact,
or similarity [44]. The present findings challenge the idea that
absolute metrics drive friendship choices by showing that a relative
metric, one’s perceived rank, remains a strong predictor of friend-
rank after controlling for benefits, frequency of contact, and
similarity.
It seems likely that participants’ perceptions of their own rank
position were often inaccurate(see[44]). Indeed, given our evidence
that people conceal friend-ranking, ascertaining accurate rank
information is probably difficult. We emphasize that models of
friendship decisions do not make predictions about the real world of
alliances, exchange, etc., but only about individuals’ representations
of the world. The underlying systems should aim to extract the
relevant information, but when these evaluations fail, actual
performance will only imperfectly approach system targets.
An important limitation of the present studies is that we did not
directly manipulate perceived rank but relied on within-subject
variation in participants’ perceptions about their friends. Future
work should aim to manipulate participants’ perceptions of their
friends’ rankings, though this might be difficult and ethically
questionable. However, it is possible that newly formed relation-
ships in the laboratory exhibit patterns similar to long-term
relationships, and if so, then it should be feasible to manipulate
new friendships to better understand alliance-building decision
processes.
Another limitation concerns the resolution of our instruments
for measuring properties of friendships. Variables such as
similarity and benefits are potentially vague and participants
could have differed in their interpretations of these items. For
instance, participants might have responded to the benefits item by
focusing on past, current, or expected future benefits. For the
exchange theory, the most relevant figures are the present values
of the streams of benefits associated with each friend, including the
discounted expected future benefits. It might be possible to assess
participants’ perceptions more precisely with higher resolution
measures.
In general, our results suggest that human friend cognition
might function, in part, to secure alliances. If so, economic
approaches [7,35–37] will be insufficient to capture this aspect of
human friendship. Instead, the underlying psychology is likely to
be strategically rich, sufficiently so to navigate the intricate
network of existing and potential alliances [13,14]. An analogy
with international relations is informative. Nations look for
different qualities in trade partners versus allies. The value of a
trade partner depends on the potential for gains in exchange. In
contrast, the value of an ally depends on the probability of support
in possible future conflicts, which necessarily depends on the ally’s
commitments to others (and less on other traits). If political
scientists tried to predict alliances on the basis of economic
exchange or proximity, they would be disappointed. The United
States and Mexico share close proximity and have important
economic ties (e.g., NAFTA), but Mexico is by no means
America’s ‘‘best friend.’’ Similarly, in 2006 the United States
traded with China over three times more than the U.K. (see www.
census.gov), but China is hardly a better ally than the U.K. If
human friendships are like international alliances, then friendship
will not be well-explained by exchanges of benefits.
In conclusion, we find that human friend cognition shows
patterns consistent with an alliance-building function. The alliance
hypothesis offers an additional way to conceptualize and
investigate human friendship. First, the alliance model draws
attention to people’s assessments of relative metrics rather than
absolutes. For instance, alliance dynamics might help to explain
why people are extremely concerned with social comparisons [46]
or with others’ relative superiority in knowledge or skills [47].
Psychological systems might be attuned to relatives, rather than
absolutes, because others’ alliance decisions are inherently
comparative. Next, the alliance hypothesis might help explain
Alliance Hypothesis
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phenomena seem inconsistent with both reciprocity theories and
ideas about communal relationships. For example, models of
indirect reciprocity [49] predict altruism toward those who help
others–the opposite of jealousy toward friends’ friends. In contrast,
alliance problems provide an obvious motive for sabotaging others’
cooperative relationships. Finally, if friends function as allies, then
possible mechanisms can be drawn from existing theory in
international relations, since nations have had to solve exactly the
same problem–assembling a network of friends who provide
support in conflicts. Psychology can leverage these tools from
game theory to guide a new approach to understanding human
friendship.
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